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ABSTRACT 
Despite the intellectual property system’s success in 
promoting the economic well-being of the United States, this 
system has not achieved all socially valuable ends. Insufficient 
treatments are applied both to diseases endemic in developing 
countries, such as malaria, and rare diseases, such as rare 
childhood cancers. Several legislative tools aim to promote 
socially valuable drugs and biologics through market incentives. 
The priority review voucher (PRV) program is the latest and 
most unique of these legislative tools aimed at encouraging the 
development of drugs for neglected diseases without burdening 
taxpayers. The Creating Hope Act—recently signed into law as 
part of the Food & Drug Administration Safety & Innovation 
Act—extends the PRV program to rare pediatric diseases. This 
Issue Brief argues that some provisions in this new legislation 
may result in undesirable collateral effects that could prevent the 
legislation from fulfilling its objective of encouraging investment 
in treatments for rare pediatric diseases. 
INTRODUCTION 
 “Everybody wins,” President Reagan declared from the Rose 
Garden on the day he signed the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act) into law.1  The 
Hatch-Waxman Act sought to carefully “strike[] a balance between two 
potentially competing policy interests—inducing pioneering 
development of pharmaceutical formulations and methods and 
facilitating efficient transition to a market with low-cost, generic copies 
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1 Remarks on Signing S. 1538 into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1359 
(Sept. 24, 1984).     
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of those pioneering inventions at the close of a patent term.”2  The 
legislation sought to accomplish this objective by offering distinct 
incentives for generic manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, and 
consumers.  For generic manufacturers, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
promised to hasten generic entry with a mechanism for abbreviated 
applications for drugs with active ingredients that the FDA had already 
approved.3  For pharmaceutical companies, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
granted up to five additional years of patent protection for new drugs to 
make up for time spent under regulatory review.4  Finally, President 
Reagan estimated that consumers would “save more than a billion dollars 
over the next 10 years.”5 
 Civilized society has long grappled with the challenge of 
balancing individual reward with the public good.6  The Hatch-Waxman 
Act has achieved much of this balance through meeting its primary goal 
of bringing low-cost generic drugs to market without burdening 
consumers.7  In fact, President Reagan’s estimate that consumers would 
                                                
2 Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Lab., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3057, 180 L. Ed. 2d 884 (2011), and rev’d, 132 
S. Ct. 1670, 182 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2012).   
3 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012) 
and 35 U.S.C. § 156) 
4 Id. at § 201. 
5 Remarks on Signing S. 1538 into Law, supra note 2.     
6 In Aristotle’s Politics, Aristotle condemns as unsafe Hippodamus’s idea of 
rewarding individuals for discovering things useful to the state.  ROBERT 
PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1–2 (5th ed. 2011). The United States Constitution also 
embodies the tension between individual self-interest and social benefit by 
granting the Congress the power to give inventors exclusive rights to their 
discoveries overlaid with the objective “To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
7 See GPhA Says New Study Shows that Hatch-Waxman is a Successful Model 
for Biogenerics Legislation Exclusivity Provisions Similar to Those in Hatch-
Waxman Would Promote Competition and Innovation, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N 
(Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.gphaonline.org/media/press-releases/2009/02/12/g 
pha-says-new-study-shows-hatch-waxman-successful-model-biogenerics- 
(“Generics represent 65% of the total prescriptions dispensed in the United 
States, but only 20% of all dollars spent on prescription drugs.”). But see, e.g., 
C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As A 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2006) (“First, 
certain features of the Act widen, often by subtle means, the potential for 
anticompetitive harm from pay-for-delay settlements. Second, the Act reflects a 
congressional judgment favoring litigated challenges, contrary to arguments 
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save $1 billion dollars in the first ten years after enactment of the Hatch-
Waxman Act may have been considerably understated.  The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that, in 1994 alone, consumers 
saved between $8 and $10 billion from substituting generic drugs for 
brand-name drugs.8 
 The U.S. regulatory and patent system, however, has not 
achieved all socially valuable ends.  Social deficiencies are particularly 
pronounced for diseases endemic in developing countries.  
Pharmaceutical firms are under a fiduciary responsibility to maximize 
profits and to recoup their research and development costs (estimated to 
be $800 million up to $12 billion).9  Consequently, executives often 
choose to develop more profitable drugs rather than drugs designed to 
treat diseases endemic in developing countries.10  For example, as a 
result of the low per capita income and weak patent protection in 
developing tropical countries, less than ten percent of global research and 
development expenditures are focused on neglected tropical diseases.  
Nevertheless, these diseases “account for over ninety percent of the 
global disease burden.”11 This discrepancy between research 
expenditures and disease burden is known as the “10/90 gap.”12   
 The profound impact that the high risk-to-return ratio for drugs 
to treat tropical diseases has on deterring investment is even more salient 
when the category of neglected tropical diseases is subdivided. Some 
tropical diseases (such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis) affect people in 
                                                                                                         
employed to justify these settlements.”); Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing 
Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the 
Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 173 (2008) (“But the 
original Act also contained provisions that were exploited by patent holders to 
delay generic competition, thereby extending their monopoly sales.”). 
8 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS 
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at ix 
(1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/10938. 
9 Joseph A, DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003) (“[W]e  
estimated that total R&D cost per new drug is US$ 802 million in 2000 
dollars.”); Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, 
FORBES (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2 
012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs (“AstraZeneca has 
spent $12 billion in research money for every new drug approved . . . .”). 
10 James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New 
Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1527 (2007). 
11 Ann Weilbaecher, Comment, Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: 
How to Incentivize Innovation, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 281, 284 (2009). 
12 Id. 
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both developed and developing countries and therefore receive moderate 
private investment.13 Other tropical diseases (such as leishmaniasis, 
schistosomiasis, and trichuriasis), however, overwhelmingly appear in 
developing countries and therefore receive little private investment.14   
 Various entities have implemented strategies designed to correct 
market failures in the patent system and promote the public good.  
Broadly defined, two strategies have emerged to increase investment in 
treatments for neglected diseases.  The first strategy involves “push” 
mechanisms. Push mechanisms provide research dollars ex ante to 
reduce initial investment risk.15  These mechanisms include grants for 
research and development (R&D), tax credits, and fast-track approval.16  
For example, donors in product development partnerships (PDPs), such 
as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, will fund a drug developer at 
the outset or on a stage-by-stage basis.17 In contrast, the second strategy 
involves the use of “pull” mechanisms. These mechanisms reward 
innovation with economic benefits ex post,18 including advanced market 
commitments (AMCs), market exclusivity provisions, patent term 
extensions, priority review vouchers, and prizes.19  The United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, for example, recently instituted a prize of 
accelerated processing of future patent applications for patent owners 
who have used their patents for humanitarian needs.20  
 The U.S. government has instituted several push and pull 
mechanisms to address the unique market failures in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  These push and pull legislative tools—each of which are aimed 
at impacting drug development for neglected diseases—include the 
Orphan Drug Act (ODA),21 Pediatric Exclusivity Provision in the Food 
and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA),22 Best 
                                                
13 ADRIAN TOWSE ET AL., OFFICE OF HEALTH ECON., DRUGS AND VACCINES FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 6 (2011), http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dbr1/resear 
ch/developing-Oxford.pdf. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 5. 
16 Id. at 21. 
17 Id. at 22. 
18 Id. at 5. 
19 Id. at 21. 
20 Patents for Humanity, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/patents_for_humanity.jsp (last updated 
Aug. 20, 2012).   
21 Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 35 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). 
22 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
115, § 111, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 351).   
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Pharmaceutical Practices for Children Act,23 Pediatric Research Equity 
Act,24 and the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 
which instituted a priority review voucher (PRV) program.25  The PRV 
program rewards developers of neglected tropical disease products ex 
post.  The reward consists of transferable vouchers for future priority 
review on a subsequent drug or biologic before the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).26  By promising to incentivize the development 
of tropical disease products without burdening taxpayers or delaying 
generic entry, the PRV program seeks to benefit all constituents 
including disease sufferers, innovators, and taxpayers.27  
 The latest legislative pull mechanism aimed at encouraging 
investment in drugs for neglected diseases is the Creating Hope Act of 
2011, which was enacted in July 2012 as part of the Food and Drug 
Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA). The Act was 
specifically designed to extend the PRV program from simply rewarding 
developers of tropical disease drugs to rewarding developers of rare 
pediatric disease products.28  A rare disease, or “orphan disease,” is a 
disease that affects less than 2-7 individuals per 10,000 in a country.29  
Companies tend to invest little in drugs to treat these rare diseases 
because they are unlikely to recoup their development costs. Drug 
developers’ hesitancy is manifest: the FDA last approved a new 
molecular entity for treating pediatric cancer over twenty years ago.30 
Although the PRV program, like the Hatch-Waxman Act, has great 
potential to ensure that “everybody wins,” several provisions in the new 
legislation may actually undermine that objective.     
                                                
23 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 
(2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
24 Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
25 Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
26 David B. Ridley, Henry G. Grabowski & Jeffrey L. Moe, Developing Drugs 
for Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. 313, 313-15 (2006). 
27 Id. at 319-21. 
28 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112—
144, § 908, 126 Stat. 993 (2012) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 360ff). 
29 D.A. Hughes et al., Drugs for Exceptionally Rare Diseases: Do They Deserve 
Special Status for Funding?, 98 QJM 829, 829 (2005). 
30 Steven Hirschfeld et al., Regulatory Approvals of Pediatric Oncology Drugs: 
Previous Experience and New Initiatives, 21 J. CLIN. ONCOLOGY 1066 (2003) 
(FDA approved teniposide for childhood leukemia in 1992).   
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I. EXISTING LEGISLATIVE TOOLS FOR PROMOTING SOCIALLY 
VALUABLE DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 
A. Orphan Drug Act of 1983 
 The Orphan Drug Act (ODA) seeks to encourage the 
development of drugs for neglected diseases through providing market 
incentives.  “The ODA was enacted in order to provide drug 
manufacturers with incentives to develop ‘orphan’ drugs—that is, drugs 
for the treatment of rare diseases or disorders that affect only small 
patient populations.”31 The FDA deems a condition “rare” if it “affects 
less than 200,000 persons in the United States” or if “there is no 
reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making available 
in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be 
recovered from sales in the United States of such drug.”32  Even a disease 
like cholera, with 3–5 million cases worldwide, may qualify as an orphan 
disease under the ODA because it affects only approximately ten 
individuals living within the United States each year.33 
 The market incentives provided by the ODA include seven years 
of market exclusivity—even without a patent—tax credits for up to fifty 
percent of qualified clinical testing expenses, and research grants for 
clinical testing of new drugs for rare diseases.34  Of these market 
incentives, the Office of Health and Human Services (HHS) concluded—
based on interviews with thirty-six biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies—that drug-producing entities valued market exclusivity as 
the most important incentive in the ODA.35  Despite the fact that 
competition for most orphan products is sparse, these entities believed 
that the assurance of market exclusivity helped them secure public and 
private capital.36   
                                                
31 Sigma-Tau Pharm., Inc. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 144 (4th Cir. 2002).   
32 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2008).   
33 Cholera, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 2012), http://www.who.int/media 
centre/factsheets/fs107/en/; E. Steinberg, et al., Cholera in the United States, 
1995-2000: Trends at the End of the Twentieth Century, 184 J. INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 799, 800 (2001).   
34 Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, §§ 2(a), 3, 5, 96 Stat. 2049 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 35 U.S.C., 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
35 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., THE ORPHAN 
DRUG ACT – IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 8 (2001).  
36 Id. 
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 HHS concluded that the ODA “unquestionably stimulated the 
development [of new drugs] for rare diseases.”37  During the ten years 
preceding the ODA’s enactment, only ten drugs for rare diseases were 
approved by the FDA and brought to market.38  In the seventeen years 
following the ODA’s enactment in 1983, however, approximately 200 
drugs for rare diseases were approved by the FDA.39  Moreover, from 
1979 to 1998, the number of available drugs for rare diseases increased 
by over 500 percent, dwarfing the 200 percent growth of non-orphan 
drugs.40 Further highlighting the success of the ODA in increasing the 
availability of orphan drugs, patient groups report experiencing few 
shortages of these orphan drugs even though the ODA makes no 
requirement that the sponsors market and distribute the drugs.41  
 
B. Pediatric Exclusivity Provision and Subsequent Legislation 
 Although the ODA led to breakthroughs in treating some rare 
diseases,42 the pharmaceutical industry still lacked pediatric formulations 
for treating a broad range of diseases.  Many companies had no incentive 
to test their drugs on pediatric populations.43  As a result, physicians had 
little choice but to prescribe drugs to children that had only been tested in 
adults.  Because children have markedly different physiology than adults, 
prescribing adult drugs to children put them at risk for adverse 
reactions.44  A recent study found, for example, that extrapolating 
pediatric dosages from adult dosages with weight-based calculations 
could be both harmful and ineffective.45  These harmful effects may 
occur because children’s bodies clear drugs at different rates than adults 
depending on their maturation stage.46  
                                                
37 Id. at 7. 
38 Marlene E. Haffner, Adopting orphan drugs—Two Dozen Years of Treating 
Rare Diseases, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 445, 445 (2006).   
39 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 36, at 7. 
40 Frank R. Lichtenberg & Joel Waldfogel, Does Misery Love Company?  
Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets Before and After the Orphan Drug Act 
3 Fig.1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W9750, 2003), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9750.   
41 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 36, at 9. 
42 Id. at 7. 
43 Aaron S. Kesselheim, Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives to Promote 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1855, 1859 (2010). 
44 Id. 
45 William Rodriguez et al., Improving Pediatric Dosing Through Pediatric 
Initiatives: What We Have Learned, 121 PEDIATRICS 530, 530 (2008).   
46 Id.   
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 Congress has passed several legislative acts to ameliorate the 
deficiency in drugs to treat pediatric diseases.  The Pediatric Exclusivity 
Provision in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 
1997 (FDAMA) awards a drug sponsor with six months of additional 
marketing exclusivity when the sponsor conducts timely pediatric 
studies.47  The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA) 
encourages more research on drugs for children.48  In 2007, Congress 
passed legislation requiring the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to 
publish a priority list of needs in pediatric pharmaceuticals.49 The 
Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA) of 2003 granted the FDA 
authority to require research for certain drugs used in pediatric 
populations.50 Finally, in 2009, the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act extended the BPCA to biologics, as well as substances 
derived from biological sources used to treat diseases.51   
 These legislative acts provide strong incentives to drug sponsors 
to conduct pediatric studies.  The Institute of Medicine—the health arm 
of the National Academy of Sciences—has concluded that these 
legislative acts have been largely successful.52  In 1998, the year just 
after FDAMA’s passage, drug labels were changed to reflect pediatric 
dosing information for only three products.53  In 2009, however, the 
FDAMA resulted in over forty drug labels changing to reflect pediatric 
information.54  Furthermore, by 2005, approximately 108 drug products 
                                                
47 Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 111, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
48 Pub. L. No. 107-109, § 3, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
49 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 
§ 502, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 
42 U.S.C.) (“[T]he Secretary, acting through the Director of the National 
Institutes of Health . . . shall develop and publish a priority list of needs in 
pediatric therapeutics, including drugs or indications that require study.”).   
50 Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, § 2, 117 Stat. 
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).   
51 Biologics Price Competition & Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 7002(a), (b), (g)(1), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 
262(a)(2)(B)).   
52 See INST. OF MED. OF NAT’L ACAD., REPORT BRIEF: SAFE AND EFFECTIVE 
MEDICINES FOR CHILDREN: PEDIATRIC STUDIES CONDUCTED UNDER THE BEST 
PHARMACEUTICALS FOR CHILDREN ACT AND THE PEDIATRIC RESEARCH EQUITY 
ACT 1 (2012), available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2012/Safe-and-
Effective-Medicines-for-Children.aspx.  But see Kesselheim, supra note 43, at 
1859. 
53 Id. at 2 fig. 
54 Id.  
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had undergone pediatric testing largely because of the FDAMA.55  
Approximately one-fifth of these pediatric tests resulted in significant 
label changes because of younger patients’ lower or higher rates of 
clearing drugs from their systems.56   
 
C. Priority Review Vouchers (PRV) in the Food & Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 
 
1. The idea behind Priority Review Vouchers (PRVs) 
 Recognizing the financial barriers to developing drugs for 
neglected tropical diseases, Professors Ridley, Grabowski, and Moe 
(hereinafter Ridley et al.) at Duke University proposed a plan to link the 
development of essential drugs for diseases endemic in developing 
countries with priority FDA approval for more profitable drugs.57  Under 
Ridley et al.’s novel proposal, a drug sponsor earns a PRV when it 
develops a drug to treat a neglected tropical disease.58  The drug sponsor 
can then redeem the PRV for expedited FDA review of any other drug, 
even non-essential or mass-market medicines that are potentially highly 
profitable.59 Before PRVs existed, the FDA only granted priority review 
in limited circumstances such as for drug products “where no satisfactory 
alternative therapy exists” or that represented “significant improvement 
compared to marketed products.”60 Priority review itself provides a 
significant advantage to drug manufacturers, as it can reduce regulatory 
review by up to seven months.61  Ridley et al. estimated that a PRV 
“would be worth more than $300 million for a potential blockbuster 
                                                
55 Rodriguez, supra note 45, at 531. 
56 Id. 
57 Ridley, supra note 26, at 313.   
58 Id. at 313–314. 
59 Id. at 314. 
60 OFFICE OF NEW DRUGS, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, MAPP 
6020.3, REVIEW CLASSIFICATION POLICY: PRIORITY (P) AND STANDARD (S) 5 
(2007). 
61 SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22814, FDA FAST TRACK AND 
PRIORITY REVIEW PROGRAMS 5 tbl.2 (2008) (finding that the median approval 
time for all standard NDAs and BLAs was 13 months in 2006 and for all priority 
NDAs and BLAs was 6 months in 2006).   
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drug, because it would shorten the time the FDA takes to analyze data 
from an average of eighteen months to about six months.”62 
 PRV’s estimated monetary value can be illustrated by applying a 
hypothetical PRV to a past “blockbuster” drug that had undergone only 
standard review.  The FDA approved the antihistamine Allegra, 
produced by Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., in July 1996 through 
standard review.63  Allegra achieved sales of at least $1 billion by its fifth 
year after product launch.64  If Hoechst had used a PRV for Allegra, 
however, it might have received FDA approval in July of 1995, and 
consequently reaped the benefit of entering the market one year earlier 
than with standard review.65  According to Ridley et al., not only would 
pharmaceutical companies like Hoechst financially benefit from priority 
review, but consumers would also benefit by gaining access to the drug 
earlier.66  Perhaps most significant, priority review rewards the 
pharmaceutical company without harming consumers because PRVs do 
not increase patent terms or delay generic pharmaceutical entry.67   
 Ridley et al. proposed two ways drug sponsors like Hoechst 
could obtain a PRV.68  First, the FDA could award a PRV to drug 
sponsors for developing a drug to treat a neglected tropical disease, such 
as dengue fever.  Because PRVs do not expire, the drug sponsor can save 
its PRV for expedited review of any future drug.  Second, one drug 
sponsor can purchase a PRV from another drug sponsor, which allows 
drug sponsors with few drug products in their product pipeline to sell 
their PRVs to those better positioned to use them.  In either scenario, the 
market incentive provides both social and private welfare gains.69   
 The PRV program adeptly seeks these economic and social 
benefits without requiring public financing or delaying generic entry.  
Ridley et al.’s article proposed that the FDA charge drug sponsors a PRV 
user fee to cover the extra costs of the program so the burden does not 
                                                
62 In the 1990s, about half of drugs that went on to become “blockbuster drugs” 
had received priority review.  The other half received standard review.  See 
Ridley, supra note 26, at 315.  But see THAUL, supra note 62. 
63 Ridley, supra note 26, at 314.   
64 Id. 
65See id. at 315.  But see THAUL, supra note 61, at 4 (noting that the decision 
time for FDA approval can vary greatly, and therefore may not be one year 
longer than for priority review, depending on various factors such as staff 
constraints at the FDA and completeness of the application). 
66 Ridley, supra note 26, at 315. 
67 Id. at 320. 
68 Id. at 313. 
69 See id. at 315.   
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fall on taxpayers.70  Partly due to strong bipartisan support because of the 
budget-neutral promise, Congress enacted the PRV provision in the Food 
& Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), just a year 
and a half after Ridley et al. first published their proposal.71 
 
2. The legislation creating PRVs  
 Section 360n of the Food & Drug Administration Amendments 
Act of 2007 (FDAAA) includes several important limitations on the 
granting of PRVs.  First, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
may only grant a PRV for a drug that treats a tropical disease such as 
tuberculosis, malaria, cholera, dengue haemorrhagic fever, leprosy or 
“[a]ny other infectious disease for which there is no significant market in 
developed nations and that disproportionately affects poor and 
marginalized populations, designated by regulation by the Secretary.”72  
Second, the Secretary may only grant a PRV for a drug with an active 
ingredient that has never been approved in any other New Drug 
Application (NDA) or Biologics License Application (BLA).73  Third, 
the tropical disease product must qualify for priority review to have a 
chance of winning a PRV.74  Although the drug treating a tropical disease 
must qualify for priority review to win a PRV, once the drug sponsor 
wins the PRV it gains priority review for any subsequent drug that would 
otherwise qualify only for standard review.   
 In addition to limits on the grant of PRVs, § 360n also includes 
limits on the use of PRVs.  To redeem a PRV, a drug sponsor must do 
two things.  First, the drug sponsor must notify the FDA of its intent to 
redeem the voucher one year before it submits a NDA.75  Second, a drug 
sponsor must pay a user fee to cover the extra costs incurred by the 
FDA’s priority review.76 For fiscal year 2013, this user fee is $3.6 
million.77  The drug sponsor becomes “legally committed” to pay the 
user fee when it notifies the FDA of its intent to use the PRV one year 
                                                
70 Id. at 315. 
71 Food & Drug Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
72 21 U.S.C. § 360n(a)(3) (2011). 
73 § 360n(a)(4)(C). 
74 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY 
REVIEW VOUCHERS 2 (2008) [hereinafter Draft Guidance]. 
75 § 360n(b)(4). 
76 § 360n(c)(1). 
77 Fee for Using a Priority Review Voucher in Fiscal Year 2013, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56649-01 (Sept. 13, 2012). 
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before applying.78 To make the voucher attractive to even small drug 
sponsors that do not have any potential “blockbusters” in their pipeline, a 
drug sponsor that receives a PRV may “transfer (including by sale) the 
entitlement to such voucher” to another entity.79  This right to transfer the 
PRV promotes economic efficiency by allowing a drug sponsor to sell 
the PRV to an entity better situated to profit from its use.  
 Under § 360n of the FDAAA, a PRV “entitles the holder of such 
voucher to priority review of a single human drug application . . . .”80  
When a drug sponsor redeems the voucher, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services must “review and take action on” the application within 
six months.81  The phrase “review and take action on” does not guarantee 
approval. Instead, within six months, an applicant will receive either 
approval or an action letter “set[ting] forth in detail the specific 
deficiencies that need to be addressed before the application can be 
approved.”82  The FDA aims for, but does not guarantee, priority review 
in six months—four months faster than its goal for standard review83 and 
seven months faster than its median standard approval time in 2006.84  
 Although § 360n largely followed Ridley et al.’s proposal for 
granting and using PRVs, the legislation included a few important 
differences. Both Ridley et al.’s proposal and § 360n limit the grant of 
PRVs to drugs that treat neglected tropical diseases.  Ridley et al.’s 
proposal, however, included more provisions aimed at maximizing the 
social benefit of these drugs.  The proposal envisioned limiting the grant 
of PRVs to companies that developed drugs or biologics exhibiting 
clinical superiority to existing treatments, companies that had foregone 
patent rights to the product, and companies that had identified at least 
one manufacturer for the tropical disease product. The impetus behind 
this limitation was a desire to increase the odds that the awardee would 
actually make the drug available.85 Furthermore, Ridley et al.’s proposal 
also suggested that the FDA adjust the incentive for developing 
treatments for neglected tropical diseases as needed by offering multiple 
PRVs.86 Despite these suggestions, no such flexibility exists in the 
                                                
78 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 75, at 2. 
79 21 U.S.C. § 360n(b)(2). 
80 § 360n(a)(2). 
81 § 360n(a)(1).   
82 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 75, at 4. 
83 Id.   
84 THAUL, supra note 61, at 5 tbl.2. 
85 Ridley, supra note 26, at 314. 
86 Id. at 319.   
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current legislation,87 and it is unclear why these provisions were not 
included.   
 The PRV program, developed from Ridley et al.’s proposal, 
works in tandem with other legislative tools toward promoting 
investment in neglected disease products. The FDA’s 2008 Guidance for 
the PRV program indicated that a tropical disease product qualifying for 
a PRV would likely also qualify for benefits under the Orphan Drug Act 
(ODA).88  The incentive to develop a drug for a rare tropical disease 
under the PRV program should be even greater when paired with ODA 
incentives, such as tax credits on R&D costs.  Based on Ridley et al.’s 
calculations, the drug sponsor would receive a net benefit of 
approximately $570 million from a PRV. This includes approximately 
$321 million from the PRV itself, plus approximately $252 million in tax 
credits from the ODA.  Together, the benefit from the PRV and the ODA 
exceed the mean clinical trial cost of $504 million of all drugs (in 2004 
dollars).89  Additionally, a drug sponsor would receive goodwill for 
developing a drug that treats a neglected tropical disease.90  
 
3. Criticism of the PRV program  
 Although the PRV program seeks to promote the development of 
drugs with social value, some scholars argue that the PRV program is 
inefficient at best and dangerous at worst.91  For example, Kesselheim, a 
research associate in Harvard’s School of Public Health, opines that the 
PRV program “is inefficient because the program does not directly 
connect the incentive with the innovation.”92  Furthermore, although 
companies without “blockbuster” drugs in their pipeline can sell the 
voucher to companies that are better situated to use it, Kesselheim claims 
that such deals will lack transparency and “raise the cost or restrict the 
future availability of the products.”93 Other potential inefficiencies 
include the criticism that the PRV legislation does not allow the FDA to 
vary the reward based upon the utility of the drug.94  
                                                
87 See 21 U.S.C. § 360n (2011). 
88 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 75, at 7. 
89 Ridley, supra note 26, at 319.   
90 Id. 
91 Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Development for Neglected Diseases — The 
Trouble with FDA Review Vouchers, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1981, 1981 (2008). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 See id. 
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 Some scholars also fear that PRVs will compromise drug 
safety.95  Traditionally, the FDA only granted priority review when a 
drug was a “[m]ajor advancement in treatment or treatment where no 
adequate therapy exists.”96  Conversely, with a PRV, a company may 
obtain priority review for drugs with little clinical value.  Kesselheim 
argues that the safety risks inherent in priority FDA review are justified 
only for drugs treating “serious problems.”97  Ridley et al., however, 
argue that drugs that underwent expedited FDA review did not have a 
higher rate of safety problems than drugs that underwent standard 
review.98 Therefore, as demonstrated by Ridley et al., the PRV program 
will not compromise drug safety. 
 The FDA’s Draft Guidance for Priority Review Vouchers 
highlights other possible limits of the PRV program.  First, a sponsor 
may win a PRV whether or not it markets the product.99  Without 
guaranteed marketing of the product, the program may not fulfill its goal 
of increasing the availability of drugs for the developing world.  Second, 
drugs that have already been approved for another indication100 or 
already approved for adults cannot receive a PRV.101 By forbidding PRV 
grants to drugs with active ingredients that the FDA previously 
approved, the program may fail to incentivize new pediatric formulations 
or new combination products that include known drugs.  Another 
legislative shortcoming is manifest within the requirement that the drug 
sponsor notify the FDA of its intent to use a PRV one year before it 
submits its application.102  Once the sponsor notifies the FDA, it is 
legally bound to pay the user fee.103  Considering the uncertainties that 
accompany drug development and the magnitude of the user fee ($3.6 
                                                
95 See id. at 1982. 
96 THAUL, supra note 62, at 3 tbl.1. 
97 See Kesselheim, supra note 92, at 1982.   
98 Ridley, supra note 26, at 321–22. 
99 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 74, at 5 (“Q6.  Would eligibility to receive a 
priority review voucher be affected in any way by whether the sponsor intends 
to market or distribute the qualifying tropical disease product after approval?  
No, it does not matter if the sponsor decides not to market the product.”). 
100 Id. at 7 (“For an application to qualify, it must be for a human drug, no active 
ingredient (including any ester or salt of the active ingredient) of which has been 
approved in any other application . . . .”). 
101 Id. (“Q18.  Would a new pediatric formulation for a drug already approved 
for adults be eligible?  No. . . . [A]n application for a product containing a 
previously approved drug is not eligible to receive a tropical disease priority 
review voucher.”).   
102 Id. at 5. 
103 Id. 
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million for Fiscal Year 2013), committing to using a PRV one year in 
advance is a financially precarious prospect for the drug sponsor. 
 
4. The first grant and use of a PRV 
 Because the PRV program is relatively new, “the actions of the 
FDA in how it handles the priority review vouchers will help shape the 
success of the tropical disease incentive program.”104 Since the PRV 
program’s inception, the pharmaceutical industry has had the chance to 
observe only one PRV grant and one redemption of a PRV. The first 
grant and use of a PRV answered some questions, but many remain.   
 Swiss-based Novartis received the first priority review voucher 
in 2009 for its anti-malarial drug Coartem (a combination of two existing 
drugs: artemether and lumefantrine).105  Coartem met all of the PRV 
grant requirements: it treated a tropical disease, qualified for priority 
review, and had never before been approved by the FDA.  However, 
even though the FDA had never before approved the active ingredients in 
Coartem, these active ingredients had been in use in the developing 
world since 2001.106  Critics of the PRV program argued that the FDA 
provided an “undeserved windfall” to Novartis because the active 
ingredients were not novel.107  Supporters of the PRV program 
acknowledged that the first awardee may have received the PRV simply 
through serendipity, but argued that the program would still incentivize 
the development of novel drugs over time.108  
 Novartis waited until 2011 to redeem its voucher for priority 
review on its supplemental biologics license application (sBLA) for Ilaris 
                                                
104 Kyle Wamstad, Note, Priority Review Vouchers — A Piece of the Incentive 
Puzzle, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 126, 144 (2009). 
105 First FDA Priority Review Voucher Awarded, 8.5 NATURE REVIEWS: DRUG 
DISCOVERY 347, 347 (2009).   
106 First Priority Review Voucher Wasted, 10 NATURE REVIEWS: DRUG 
DISCOVERY 721, 721 (2011).   
107 Aaron S. Kesselheim, Priority Review Vouchers: An Inefficient and 
Dangerous Way to Promote Neglected-Disease Drug Development, 85 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 573, 574 (2009); Wamstad, 
supra note 105, at 127–-28 (“Herein lies the problem: there is no need to 
encourage an innovation already in wide use throughout the developing 
world.”). 
108 Wamstad, supra note 105, at 128 (“One of the original authors of the policy 
paper, Jeffrey Moe, acknowledges that the first applicants for a qualifying 
voucher ‘will get them essentially by serendipity’ . . . .”). 
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(canakinub) to treat gouty arthritis.109 However, rather than the early 
approval Novartis hoped for, the FDA requested additional clinical data 
on the risks to patients.110  After this result, critics of the PRV program 
pointed out that Novartis paid a $5,280,000 priority voucher user fee on 
top of the sBLA fee without receiving any benefit.111  
 The criticisms of the first PRV award to Novartis for Coartem 
and the subsequent first use of the PRV for Ilaris may be greatly 
exaggerated.  Regardless of the request for more clinical data, the total 
review time for Coartem still outpaced standard review.112  BIO Ventures 
for Global Health points out that “[i]t is important to keep in mind that 
the PRV program was never designed to produce a different outcome 
upon FDA review, but simply a faster outcome.”113 The claimed 
“failures” of the first grant and use of a PRV may actually be successes, 
demonstrating the FDA’s commitment to honoring the vouchers without 
compromising safety and providing future voucher holders with more 
guidance on how to maximize the voucher’s value.114   
 A recent survey shed light on certain reservations held by drug 
companies with regard to the PRV program.115  The survey revealed that 
most companies viewed the PRV program as an additional factor, but not 
the deciding factor, in their decision to pursue drugs or vaccines for 
neglected tropical diseases.116  The potential market value of the drug or 
vaccine was still the overriding factor in a company’s decision to 
instigate research.117  Companies expressed concern over not knowing 
the true value of the voucher and also worried that the FDA would not 
support the program.118  Companies said they would consider the PRV 
program more of an incentive after “a demonstrated sale of a voucher, 
with the purchase price disclosed to developers.”119 However, given the 
                                                
109 Bethany Hughes, Priority Voucher Flops, 29 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 958, 
958 (2011).   
110 Id.   
111 Id.   
112 Novartis Plays its PRV Card, BIO VENTURES FOR GLOBAL HEALTH (July 8, 
2011), http://www.bvgh.org/News/Dispatches-from-the-Crossroads/PostID/71.a 
spx. 
113 Id. 
114 First Priority Review Voucher Wasted, supra note 106, at 721.   
115 Andrew S. Robertson et al., The Impact of the US Priority Review Voucher 
on Private-Sector Investment in Global Health Research and Development, 6 
PLOS NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASE 1 (2012). 
116 Id. at 5. 
117 Id.at 2. 
118 Id. at 3. 
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fact that drug development takes several years, the PRV program’s 
success or failure cannot be evaluated so quickly.120  In fact, the potential 
benefits of the PRV program are still so attractive that Congress recently 
extended the program to rare pediatric diseases.121     
II. CREATING HOPE ACT  
 President Obama signed the Creating Hope Act (CHA) into law 
as part of the Food & Drug Administration Safety & Innovation Act 
(FDASIA) on July 9, 2012.122  The CHA aims to ameliorate perceived 
weaknesses in the original PRV program and extend the program to 
drugs for rare pediatric diseases.123  A rare pediatric disease is one that 
“primarily affects individuals from birth to 18 years, including age 
groups often called neonates, infants, children and adolescents.”124  In 
March 2011, Senator Bob Casey introduced the bill to “strengthen a cost-
neutral FDA program giving biopharmaceutical companies an incentive 
to develop treatments for rare diseases that are often less profitable than 
treatments for more common medical conditions.”125  Nancy Goodman, 
founder of the Kids v. Cancer advocacy organization and a champion for 
the Creating Hope Act, similarly believes the Act will “encourage the 
creation of new drugs for underserved children who suffer from serious 
and rare medical conditions, including life-threatening cancers . . . .”126  
A. Differences Between the PRV Legislation for Rare Pediatric 
Diseases and the PRV Legislation for Neglected Tropical Diseases 
 The legislation for rare pediatric diseases largely mirrors the 
original PRV legislation for neglected tropical diseases, but with some 
important differences.  First, new 21 U.S.C. § 360ff will increase 
economic efficiency by making explicit that entities may transfer a PRV 
                                                
120 Hughes, supra note 110, at 958. 
121 Creating Hope Act, H.R. 3059, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).   
122 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
144, § 908, 126 Stat. 993 (2012) (codified in 21 U.S.C. § 360ff). 
123 Creating Hope Act, H.R. 3059, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).   
124 Id. 
125  Casey Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Help Develop Treatments for Rare 
Diseases, ROBERT P. CASEY JR., UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR PENNSYLVANIA 
(Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.casey.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=a8d 
eb1ac-6ffd-424b-84b9-c166b4d6ff73. 
126 Creating Hope Act of 2011 – A Priority Review Voucher for Pediatric Rare 
Diseases, KIDS V. CANCER, http://www.kidsvcancer.org/thecreatinghopeact/ 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2012).   
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an unlimited number of times.127  The original PRV program, codified in 
§ 360n, left open the question of whether the voucher could be sold to 
another entity.128 By making explicit that entities may sell the voucher an 
unlimited number of times, the CHC reduces the perceived risk for the 
voucher’s would-be purchaser.   
 Second, new § 360ff reduces the period required for notifying 
the FDA of intent to use the voucher from 365 days to 90 days before 
use.129  This change makes voucher use less risky for a drug sponsor.  
Because the notification of a drug sponsor’s intent to redeem the voucher 
is “a legally binding commitment”130 to pay a $3.6 million fee,131 drug 
sponsors desire as much clinical data as possible before committing to 
redeem the voucher.  The ninety-day requirement balances the drug 
sponsor’s need for gathering data before committing and the FDA’s need 
for adequate advanced notice to gather enough resources for the priority 
review process.  
 Third, the CHA allows the new drug sponsor to obtain a 
designation at the beginning of the application process that the drug is an 
eligible treatment for a rare pediatric disease.132  With this early 
designation, the drug sponsor is assured that it will receive a voucher if 
the drug is approved.  By contrast, under the original PRV legislation, 
drug sponsors remain uncertain about whether the drug is even eligible 
                                                
127 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
144, § 908, 126 Stat. 993 (2012) (“There is no limit on the number of times a 
priority review voucher may be transferred before such voucher is used.”). 
128 21 U.S.C. § 360n(b)(2) (2011) (“The sponsor of the tropical disease product 
that receives a priority review voucher under this section may transfer (including 
by sale) the entitlement to such voucher to a sponsor of a human drug for which 
an application . . . will be submitted . . . .”). 
129 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
144, § 908, 126 Stat. 993 (2012) (“The sponsor of a human drug application 
shall notify the Secretary not later than 90 days prior to submission of the human 
drug application that is the subject of a priority review voucher of an intent to 
submit the human drug application . . . .”). 
130 21 U.S.C. § 360n(b)(4) (2011).    
131 Fee for Using a Priority Review Voucher in Fiscal Year 2013, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56649-01 (Sept. 13, 2012). 
132 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
144, § 908, 126 Stat. 993 (2012) (“Upon the request of the manufacturer or the 
sponsor of a new drug, the Secretary may designate . . . the application for the 
new drug as a rare pediatric disease product application.”). 
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for a PRV until the FDA grants or denies approval.133  Like the 
provisions for clarifying transferability and reducing the length of 
notification, the early designation provision makes the PRV program less 
risky for a drug sponsor.   
 Fourth, the CHA requires an assessment of the PRV program 
after the FDA has awarded three PRVs, and allows termination of the 
PRV program at that time.134  The Government Accountability Office is 
instructed to “conduct a study of the effectiveness of awarding rare 
pediatric disease priority vouchers under this section in the development 
of human drug products that treat or prevent such diseases.”135  This 
provision allows an independent assessment of the efficacy of the 
program, which was lacking from the original PRV legislation.   
B. Collateral Effects of the CHA 
 Although the transfer, notification, and designation provisions in 
the CHA go a long way toward encouraging the use of PRVs, some 
provisions may have collateral effects.136 First, the CHA may fail to 
incentivize the development of the most promising new treatments for 
rare pediatric diseases.  The CHA prohibits drug sponsors from receiving 
a PRV for a rare pediatric disease product with active ingredients that the 
FDA has approved in any other application.137 Although such a provision 
is helpful for preventing gamesmanship when applied to tropical disease 
                                                
133  21 U.S.C. § 360n(b)(1) (2011) (“The Secretary shall award a priority review 
voucher to the sponsor of a tropical disease product application upon approval 
by the Secretary . . . .”) (emphasis added).   
134 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
144, § 908, 126 Stat. 993 (2012) (“The Secretary may not award any priority 
review vouchers under paragraph (1) after the last day of the 1–year period that 
begins on the date that the Secretary awards the third rare pediatric disease 
priority voucher under this section.”). 
135 Id. 
136 Legislative and Regulatory Responses to the FTC Study on Barriers to Entry 
in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 8, 14 (2003) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief 
Counsel, FDA) (“FDA has tried to maintain a balance between protecting 
innovation in drug development and in expediting the approval of lower-cost 
generic drugs . . . . But let me say that there is no way, through rulemaking or 
through legislation, to avoid all opportunities for gaming . . . . [T]here are 
unforeseen circumstances and unintended consequences.”). 
137 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
144, § 908, 126 Stat. 993 (2012) (“The term ‘rare pediatric disease product 
application’ means a human drug application, as defined in section 735(1), that . 
. . contains no active ingredient (including any ester or salt of the active 
ingredient) that has been previously approved in any other application . . . .”). 
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products, the provision may actually compromise the incentive for the 
most promising innovations for rare pediatric diseases involving cancer.   
 For example, this amendment in the Creating Hope Act would 
exclude from reward a promising innovation in cancer therapy that 
involves conjugating known chemotherapy drugs to “drug delivery 
vehicles” such as nanoparticles, stem cells or T cells.138  These drug 
delivery vehicles help the known chemotherapy agents bypass biological 
barriers (such as the blood-brain barrier), minimize side effects of 
chemotherapy drugs by specifically delivering the known drugs to cancer 
sites rather than having the drugs released into the entire body, and aid in 
preventing drug resistance and monitoring treatment.139  Nanoparticles 
attached to a standard chemotherapy drug, docetexel, have been shown to 
cause complete remission of lymphoma in mice.140 Furthermore, self-
assembling antibody nanorings and other nanoparticles conjugated to 
known chemotherapy drugs have shown promise in treating leukemia, a 
deadly cancer in children.141 Similar strides have been made using iron 
oxide nanovehicles to transport the known cancer drug, doxorubicin, to 
prevent multidrug resistance in a sort of ‘Trojan Horse’ mechanism.142   
 If the promise of a PRV is limited to drugs that contain no active 
ingredients previously approved by the FDA, the PRV program will not 
work to incentivize companies to use known chemotherapy drugs with 
these novel delivery vehicles. Legislatures should not tailor the 
requirements of obtaining a PRV too narrowly to traditional notions of 
drug development while inadvertently excluding the most promising 
mechanisms of innovation. 
 Even without considering the next wave of cancer therapy 
innovation, many successful treatments for rare pediatric diseases have 
historically involved finding new uses for known drugs.  In 2011, for 
example, the FDA approved Soliris (eculizumab) for the rare pediatric 
blood disorder of atypical Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome (aHUS).  The 
                                                
138 See Forrest M. Kievit & Miqin Zhang, Cancer Nanotheranostics: Improving 
Imaging and Therapy by Targeted Delivery Across Biological Barriers, 23 
ADVANCED MATERIALS H217, H217 (2011). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at H238 (2011). 
141 Id. 
142 The known chemotherapy drug conjugated to the nanoparticle prevents 
multidrug resistance by waiting to release the chemotherapy drug until the 
nanoparticle is inside the cancer cell.  Id.  In standard treatments, chemotherapy 
drugs are freely released into the body before reaching the cancerous site 
allowing “a small proportion of cells that are resistant to the therapy [to] survive 
to form a resistant tumor.  Id. 
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FDA had previously approved Soliris for the rare adult condition of 
Paroxysmal Nocturnal Hemoglobinuria (PNH).143  Under the CHA, 
Soliris would not receive a PRV because the drug had already been 
approved for adults.  Arguably, the PRV program should encourage 
investigation into using known adult drugs to treat rare pediatric 
diseases.  
 Second, the CHA may hasten the entry of pediatric applications 
at the needless expense of delaying adult treatments.  Under the CHA, a 
rare pediatric disease product application is ineligible for a PRV if it 
“seek[s] approval for an adult indication in the original rare pediatric 
disease product application.”144  Preventing drug sponsors from applying 
for both adult and pediatric indications simultaneously will simply delay 
adult treatments rather than encourage pediatric developments.  Such a 
provision will also increase total regulatory costs by encouraging 
companies to seek approval for pediatric and adult indications at 
different times without the benefit of economies of scale in the 
regulatory process.  Empirical evidence may elucidate how often 
treatments for pediatric and adult diseases overlap and what benefit, if 
any, pediatric patients would receive by delaying adult treatment.   
 Third, the CHA may disproportionately burden universities and 
small companies.  The CHA’s marketing requirement is aimed at 
encouraging drug sponsors to manufacture and market drugs post 
approval.145  For rare pediatric disease products, the provision allows the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to revoke a priority review 
voucher if the product is not marketed in the United States within a year 
of FDA approval.146  For all its good intentions, this marketing 
requirement may disproportionately affect universities and small 
businesses.  Because a university’s expertise exists primarily in creating 
knowledge and conducting research, it is unreasonable for these entities 
to be required to take on the burden of marketing the drug.  Congress 
should consider other options of encouraging drug sponsors to market the 
drug, such as creating an exemption for universities, requiring entities to 
give up or sell their intellectual property rights if they do not intend to 
market the drug, or providing a second reward or recognition five years 
                                                
143 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA APPROVES SOLIRIS FOR RARE PEDIATRIC 
BLOOD DISORDER (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom 
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144 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
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after initial approval for entities that do succeed in promoting access to 
the drug.   
 Fourth, the Creating Hope Act fails to create a nexus between the 
magnitude of the reward and the drug’s improvement over existing 
therapies.  One criticism of the PRV program for neglected tropical 
disease products is the lack of a link between the reward and utility of the 
drug.147 The Creating Hope Act fails to rectify this problem.   Section 
360n(b) orders the Secretary to award a PRV upon approval of any 
tropical disease product application, with no regard to the extent that the 
drug will improve human health.148 Congress should consider whether 
this one-size-fits-all reward system best advances its objective of 
improving the lives of people suffering from neglected tropical diseases 
or rare pediatric diseases.  The PRV program may encourage the 
development of more desirable drugs if sponsors could receive a second 
PRV five years after approval for drugs found to significantly impact the 
Quality-Adjusted Life year (QALY) or Disability-Adjusted Life year 
(DALY) of the target population.  QALY and DALY are standard 
calculations for the economic value of medical treatments.   
 Finally, extending the PRV program to rare pediatric diseases 
may actually undermine the PRV program for neglected tropical 
diseases. On one hand, the PRV program for neglected tropical diseases 
has resulted in only one grant and use of a PRV in the last five years. 
Thus, awarding a PRV for a rare pediatric disease drug product may help 
jumpstart the program for neglected tropical diseases by resolving some 
of the current legislation’s ambiguity.  On the other hand, the transfer 
value of a PRV depends on the number of vouchers on the market.  If the 
market is flooded with PRVs, the value of each will decline.  Congress 
should therefore evaluate whether extending the program to rare 
pediatric diseases will actually result in a reduced value for PRVs and 
reduced incentives for sponsors.    
CONCLUSION 
 The priority review voucher (PRV) program holds great promise 
as a tool to both increase investment in drugs used to treat neglected 
diseases and reward sponsors for their innovations without burdening 
taxpayers.  However, Congress may have prematurely extended the 
program to rare pediatric diseases by signing the Creating Hope Act into 
                                                
147 See Kesselheim, supra note 92 (“[A]n effective novel antimalarial drug that 
degrades in the heat and must be taken six times a day would earn its sponsor a 
voucher, but no voucher would be granted for a follow-on formulation that 
might be more useful in resource-poor settings.”). 
148 Creating Hope Act, H.R. 3059, 112th Cong. § 2(c)(1) (2011). 
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law under the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act 
of 2012.  Although founded on the best intentions, the Creating Hope Act 
may exclude some of the most promising research areas for pediatric 
drug development, needlessly delay adult treatments at only a marginal 
benefit for pediatric patients, disproportionately burden small businesses 
and universities, fail to link the utility of the drug to the magnitude of the 
reward, and possibly even undermine the PRV program that already 
exists for tropical disease products. The GAO should consider all these 
possible collateral effects when it evaluates the program.149   The GAO’s 
evaluation will elucidate whether these concerns are valid and will help 
guide the drafting of future legislation seeking to expand the PRV 
program to other classes of neglected diseases.  
                                                
149 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
144, § 908, 126 Stat. 993 (2012) (“Beginning on the date that the Secretary 
awards the third rare pediatric disease priority voucher under this section, the 
Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a study of the 
effectiveness of awarding rare pediatric disease priority vouchers . . . .”). 
